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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the entry of summary judgment in the Third Judicial District 
Court, Tooele County, State of Utah, the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod presiding. This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) and Utah R. App. P. 
42(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court acted within its discretion when it excluded Mr. Ladd's 
dream-enhanced testimony from consideration on Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
Preservation. This issue was preserved for appeal in the briefing on Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment.1 
Standard of Review. "We review a trial court's decision to admit or preclude evidence 
to determine whether the court acted within its permitted range of discretion."2 
2. Whether the trial court was correct in finding there were no genuine issues of 
material fact. 
Preservation. This issue was preserved for appeal in the briefing on Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment.3 
!R. 124 and 231-232. 
2State v. Vialpando, 2004 UT App 95, % 8, 89 P.3d 209. 
3R. 124-127, 229-231, and 233. 
Standard of Review. "In determining whether the trial court correctly found that there 
was no genuine issue of material fact, we view the facts and inferences to be drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party."4 
3. Whether the trial court erred in finding Mr. Ladd was required to designate 
expert witnesses to prove causation. 
Preservation. This issue was preserved for appeal in the briefing on Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment.5 
Standard of Review. "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, we 
review the trial court's ruling on legal issues for correctness."6 
4. Whether the trial court erred in finding Mr. Ladd cannot prove causation as a 
matter of law. 
Preservation. This issue was preserved for appeal in the briefing on Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment.7 
Standard of Review. "When reviewing a court's decision to grant summary judgment, 
we examine the court's legal conclusions for correctness."8 
4Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 173 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 
1989). 
5R. 123-124,227-229. 
6Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 303,^j 8,141 P.3d 629 (internal citations omitted). 
7R. 123-124,227-229. 
^Thurston v. Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, 2003 UT App 438, |10, 83 P.3d 
391. 
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5. Whether Mr, Ladd preserved his argument that his treating physicians could 
testify regarding causation. 
Preservation. Mr. Ladd did not preserve this issue for appeal because he only argued 
that he could testify regarding causation before the trial court.9 
Standard of Review. "Generally, a party cannot raise an issue for the first time on 
appeal. Instead, the party must preserve the issue for appeal by presenting it to the trial court 
in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.... Issues that are not 
properly preserved are usually deemed waived."10 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-820(l) 
Subject to Section 78B-5-818, the maximum amount for which a defendant may be 
liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of the damages 
equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that defendant. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3)(A) 
A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may be used at 
trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3)(B) 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, this disclosure shall, 
with respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony 
in the case or whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve giving expert 
testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness or party. 
The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify; the 
9R. 182-183. 
l0LaChance v. Richman, 2011 UT App 40, f 15, 248 P.3d 1020 (internal citations 
omitted). 
3 
substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of 
the grounds for each opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all 
publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be 
paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has 
testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) 
Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify 
to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred 
to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit 
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or 
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided 
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the 
pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 104(a) 
Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning the 
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of 
evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b). In 
making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect 
to privileges. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 402 
All relevant evidence is admissible, expect as otherwise provided by the Constitution 
of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by 
other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is inadmissible. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
4 
Utah Rule of Evidence 601 
(a) General rule of competency. Every person is competent to be a witness expect as 
otherwise provided in these rules. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 602 
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to 
support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove 
personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the witness' own testimony. This rule is 
subject to the provisions of Rule 703, relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a series of three accidents that occurred eastbound on 1-80 between 
Wendover, Nevada and Salt Lake City, Utah early in the morning on Sunday, August 10, 
2003.n Mr. Ladd claims that in addition to being seriously injured in the first rollover 
accident, he was also injured in the third accident when a semi-truck driven by Tyrone 
Granlund ran into a pickup and threw it eastward.12 Mr. Ladd has no memory of the second 
accident and his recollection of the details of the third accident are based on a dream he had 
approximately six months after the accident.13 After discovery had closed, Defendants 
brought a motion for summary judgment arguing that Mr. Ladd's dream testimony was 
inadmissible and all admissible evidence showed he was not involved in the third accident. 
Further, even if his testimony was admissible, he could not prove causation because he did 
nR. 8-9 
12R. 8. 
13R. 165. 
not designate an expert that could establish a causal link between the third accident and his 
injuries.l4 The Third District Court granted Defendants' motion finding that Mr. Ladd did not 
present admissible evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact and that, because he 
did not designate an expert witness, he could not prove medical causation.lD 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff/Appellant Christopher Ladd ("Mr. Ladd") and his friend Christopher 
Rasmussen ("Mr. Rasmussen") had gone to Wendover on Saturday, August 9, 2003. While 
in Wendover, Mr. Ladd and Mr. Rasmussen consumed alcohol. The two friends began their 
journey home early the next day at approximately 4:00 a.m.16 Mr. Rasmussen was driving a 
small silver pickup ("pickup").17 
Traffic on 1-80 was light, but the friends did encounter and pass some cars on their 
way home.18 The friends passed cars driven by Natasha Nielsen ("Ms. Nielsen") and Barbara 
Long.19 After passing these cars, Mr. Rasmussen began to swerve, lost control of his pickup, 
and the pickup rolled.20 This was the first accident. It appeared that Mr. Rasmussen was 
14R. 123-130 
l5R. 288. 
16R. 102 and 224. 
17R. 9. 
,8R. 101. 
19R. 106. 
20R. 99-101. 
driving fatigued or intoxicated.21 After the pickup rolled, Ms. Nielsen and Barbara Long 
pulled their cars off to the side of the road.22 Ms. Nielsen and the passengers in her car, 
including Thomas Riessen (uMr. Riessen"), exited their vehicle to see if the could offer 
assistance to the victims of the rollover.23 
Mr. Riessen and Ms. Nielsen approached the scene of the rollover accident and 
noticed that no one was in the pickup truck.24 The two then noticed a man lying on the 
ground east of the pickup. This man was Mr. Rasmussen.25 Ms. Nielsen left the scene of the 
accident because she was afraid that on-coming traffic would not see the pickup and collide 
with it.26 Sometime after the rollover accident, a second accident occurred when Richard Oak 
drove past the pickup and clipped it.27 
While Mr. Riessen was attempting to assist Mr. Rasmussen, Tyrone Granlund, an 
employee of Bowers Trucking, Inc. (collectively "Defendants"), drove a semi-truck into the 
pickup which threw the pickup into Mr. Riessen and Mr. Rasmussen.28 This was the third 
2lR. 106. 
22R. 128. 
2
'Id. 
24R. 111. 
25R. I l l , 128, and208. 
26R. 207. 
27R. 128 and 207. 
28R. 110. 
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accident. There were no other people involved in this semi-truck and pickup truck accident.29 
Mr. Riessen was injured in the accident and Mr. Rasmussen and Tyrone Granlund were 
killed.30 Mr. Ladd was found west of the pickup and was taken by life-flight from the scene.31 
The investigating officer, Trooper Craig Ward ("Trooper Ward"), found that three 
accidents had occurred.32 The first accident was the rollover accident involving Mr. Ladd and 
Mr. Rasmussen. The second accident occurred when Richard Oak drove by and clipped the 
pickup driven by Mr. Rasmussen. The third accident was when Tyrone Granlund drove the 
semi-truck into the pickup and hurled it into Mr. Riessen and Mr. Rasmussen.33 Based on his 
investigation, Trooper Ward found no indication that Mr. Ladd was involved in the third 
accident.34 His investigation concluded that both Mr. Ladd and Mr. Rasmussen were ejected 
from the pickup in the first accident. Mr. Ladd was ejected and landed west of the pickup in 
the median while Mr. Rasmussen landed east of the pickup partially in the road.35 
29R. 109 and 206. 
30R. 8. 
3lR. 8, 120-121, and 168. 
32R. 115. 
33R. 120. 
34R. 114-115. 
35R. 114-115, 120, and 166. 
Four to six months after the accident Mr. Ladd had a dream wherein he "relived" the 
accident.36 Until he had this dream, Mr. Ladd had no recollection of any of the accidents.37 
In his dream, Mr. Ladd saw Mr. Rasmussen being ejected from the pickup. His dream had 
no second accident. Then, Mr. Ladd cut himself free from the pickup and climbed out. In the 
next part of the dream, Mr. Ladd pulls himself off the ground in time to see headlights, hear 
a loud noise, and feel extreme pain. The dream ends after Mr. Ladd comes to after being hit 
by the pickup, finds his friend Mr. Rasmussen dead, and runs in horror until he collapses.38 
Mr. Ladd filed suit against Defendants in Third District Court alleging that 
Defendants were negligent in causing his injuries.39 During the discovery phase, Mr. Ladd 
did not designate any expert witnesses.40 After the close of discovery, Defendants filed a 
motion for summary judgment arguing that Mr. Ladd's dream testimony is in admissible and 
that he could not prove causation because he did not designate an expert witness that could 
establish causation among the separate impacts.41 The court granted Defendants' motion 
finding that both these grounds have merit.42 This appeal followed. 
36R. 98. 
37R. 96. 
38R. 164-166 and 171-
39R. 3-10. 
-178. 
40R. 233 and Brief of Appellant, p. 
41R. 95 and 123-130. 
42R. 288. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Defendants' first argument is that Mr. Ladd cannot present admissible evidence to 
create a genuine issue of material fact. Mr. Ladd's only recollection of the details of the 
accident is based on a dream he had approximately six months after the accident. This dream-
enhanced testimony is unreliable and inadmissible. Mr. Ladd does not remember the accident 
so he does not have personal knowledge and is therefore incompetent to testify. Mr. Ladd's 
inadmissible testimony is the only evidence linking him to the third accident. All admissible 
evidence establishes that he was not involved in any accident with Defendants and that all 
his injuries were caused by the first accident. 
Defendants further argue that even if Mr. Ladd's dream testimony is admitted and 
assumed to be true, his claim fails because he cannot prove causation. This is a complex case 
involving three accidents and obscure medical issues. In such cases, Utah law requires that 
plaintiffs provide expert testimony to establish causation. Mr. Ladd did not designate any 
experts and cannot meet his burden to prove causation. A jury could only speculate regarding 
which accident caused which injury. Thus, his claim fails as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. There is No Material Issue of Fact as Dream Testimony is Inadmissible 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that "Plaintiff did not present 
admissible evidence to contradict the material facts presented by Defendants."43 The trial 
court can only consider admissible evidence on a motion for summary judgment and Mr. 
R. 288. 
10 
Ladd's testimony is inadmissible. All the admissible evidence shows there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and that Mr. Ladd was not involved in an accident with Defendants. 
A. Only admissible evidence can be considered on summary judgment 
Utah courts have repeatedly held that Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
prevents a court from considering inadmissible evidence on a motion for summary 
judgment.44 "It is true that inadmissible evidence cannot be considered in mling on a motion 
for summary judgment."45 Thus, Mr. Ladd's assertion that the trial court "weighed the 
evidence" is misplaced as he did not present any admissible evidence for the trial court to 
weigh.46 
A trial court's decision to preclude evidence is reviewed "to determine whether the 
court acted within its permitted range of discretion."47 Rule 104(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence gives the trial court broad discretion in determining the competency of a witness 
and "such discretion will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of abuse."48 The trial court 
acted within its discretion when it excluded Mr. Ladd's testimony regarding the accident. Mr. 
Ladd's testimony is based on a dream he had several months after the accident.49 As a result, 
"Seee.g. Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857,859 (Utah 1983) andPanos v. Olsen and 
Associates Const, Inc., 2005 UT App 446, \ 6, fn 2, 123 P.3d 816. 
45D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989). 
46Brief of Appellant, p. 6. 
47State v. McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, f 7, 110 P.3d 149 (internal citations omitted). 
"State v. Sisneros, 581 P.2d 1339, 1343 (Utah 1978). 
49R. 165. 
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the testimony is wholly unreliable and not based on personal knowledge. Excluding the 
testimony was not a clear abuse of discretion. Because Mr. Ladd's testimony is inadmissible, 
the trial court's order finding that he "did not present admissible evidence to contradict the 
material facts presented by Defendants" is not error.30 The trial court's grant of summary 
judgment should be affirmed, 
B. Mr. Ladd is not competent to testify 
Mr. Ladd argues that he is competent to testify and 1hat his testimony is sufficient to 
create a material issue of fact. He asserts that under Utah R. Evid. 601 he is presumed 
competent to testify and under State v. Eldridge51 he would be competent to testify because 
he had the opportunity and capacity to perceive the accident.52 However, the trial court was 
correct in finding Mr. Ladd incompetent to testify and that his dream-enhanced testimony is 
inadmissible. 
It is generally accepted that there are five elements to determine whether a witness is 
competent to testify: (1) the ability to perceive a matter or situation; (2) the ability to 
remember with minimal clarity and accuracy what has been perceived; (3) the ability to 
communicate the perception to the trier of fact; (4) the recognition of an obligation to the tell 
the truth; and (5) personal knowledge of the subject matter.53 Mr. Ladd is not competent to 
50R. 288. 
51773P.2d 29 (Utah 1989). 
52Brief of Appellant, pp. 7-9. 
53See Federal Evidence Practice Guide, ^ f 10.02[2] (citing 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence in 
Trials at Common Law §§ 492-702). See also State v. All Real Property, Residence & 
12 
testify because he fails to meet at least three of these elements. Specifically, Mr. Ladd did not 
have the ability to perceive the situation, he does not have the ability to remember what he 
perceived, and he cannot testify based on personal knowledge. Thus, Mr. Ladd is not 
competent to testify under Utah R. Evid. 602. 
1. Mr. Ladd did not have the ability to perceive the situation 
Utah courts have long recognized "the conclusion that human perception is inexact 
and that human memory is both limited and fallible."54 Thus, Utah courts have recognized 
"the modern reconstructive theory of memory" and have specifically rejected the view "that 
the mind is a camera or tape recorder from which historical events can be retrieved by simply 
pushing a button ,..."55 Mr. Ladd's argument that he is competent to testify and that his dream 
testimony is admissible is based on the theories of human perception and memory rejected 
by this court.56 
According to the modern reconstructive theory of memory accepted by Utah courts, 
any number of factors could have influenced and changed Mr. Ladd's perceptions of the 
accident during the six months between the accident and Mr. Ladd's dream. As the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized in State v. Long: 
Appurtenances, 2005 UT 90, f 10, n. 4, 127 P.3d 693 ("This court recognizes the 
persuasiveness of federal interpretations when the state and federal rules are similar and few 
Utah cases deal with the rule in question.") (internal citations omitted). 
"State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986). 
"State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1210 (Utah 1989). 
56See Brief of Appellant, p. 8 (Mr. Ladd's memory of the accident "resurfaced" several 
months after the accident). 
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Anyone who stops to consider the matter will recognize that the process of 
perceiving events and remembering them is not as simple or as certain as 
turning on a camera and recording everything the camera sees on tape or film 
for later replay. What we perceive and remember is the result of a much more 
complex process, one that does not occur without involving the whole person, 
and one that is profoundly affected by who we are and what we bring to the 
event of perception.^7 
The Court in Long also found that failures and inaccuracies may occur at any stage of the 
"memory process."58 During the first stage, or acquisition stage, inaccuracies likely entered 
into Mr. Ladd's perception because of the circumstances of his observation. Mr. Ladd had 
been drinking59 and had just experienced a severe and traumatic rollover car accident at 
freeway speeds. Further, it appears that Mr. Ladd was unconscious after the rollover as he 
does not remember anything until he woke up in the hospital.60 Mr. Ladd was not in a 
physical or emotional state to accurately perceive his surroundings or the events of the 
accidents.61 
Mr. Ladd's perception of the event could have also been influenced during the 
retention stage. During this stage inaccurate information can be stored as a "memory." 
57721P.2dat488. 
*Id. 
59R. 102 and 224. 
60R.220. 
6[See Long, 721 P.2d at 488-89 (accuracy of one's perception is greatly affected by an 
individual's physical condition, including factors of fatigue, alcohol use, and emotional state, 
and when an individual is experiencing a marked degree of stress, perceptual abilities 
decrease significantly). 
14 
Research demonstrates that both the length of time between the witness's 
experience and the recollection of that experience, and the occurrence of other 
events in the intervening time period, affect the accuracy and completeness of 
recall. ... [I]n the retention stage people tend to add extraneous details and to 
fill in memory gaps over time, thereby unconsciously constructing more 
detailed, logical, and coherent recollections of their actual experiences."62 
Mr. Ladd had six months to stew over the accident and create any variety of scenarios to fill 
in his memory gaps. In six months there was also ample time for other events in Mr. Ladd's 
life to influence his perception of the accident. Mr. Ladd was not able to accurately perceive 
the accident and his perception was influenced by any number of factors during the six 
months between the accident and his dream. As he did not accurately perceive the accident, 
Mr. Ladd is not competent to testify and his dream-enhanced testimony is inadmissible. 
2. Mr. Ladd does not have the ability to remember what he perceived 
Mr. Ladd has testified that he cannot remember any details of the accidents or the 
aftermath.63 When a witness states he cannot remember the relevant time period, he has 
declared himself incompetent to testify regarding that time period. 
"Even a wealth of perceptual experience is worth nothing if it is not remembered. A 
witness's key vantage point, at times germane to a dispute, is similarly worth nothing if the 
witness cannot remember what happened.... [Tjhis axiom is of such a common sense variety 
that most courts and commentators seldom discuss the issue at any length."64 Mr. Ladd's 
reliance on Eldridge is misplaced because his opportunity and alleged capacity to perceive 
62See Long, 111 P.2d at 489-90. 
63R. 220. 
64Federal Evidence Practice Guide, If 10.02[2][b]. 
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the accident is worthless. He does not remember any details of the accident so whether he 
had the opportunity or capacity to perceive anything is moot. 
In Eldridge the defendant asserted that the testimony of a child should be excluded 
because the child's "memory of the subject matter of the testimony [was] less than 
complete."65 The case did not involve recovered memories or enhanced memories. Thus, 
Eldridge is distinguishable from the case at bar. First, Mr. Ladd has testified that until he had 
his dream, he had no recollection of the accident.66 Thus, Mr. Ladd's testimony was not "less 
than complete;" it was nonexistent. Also, unlike the testimony in Eldridge, Mr. Ladd's 
memory was allegedly recovered and enhanced by his dream.67 In actuality, the dream did 
not refresh Mr. Ladd's memory of the accident. Mr. Ladd only remembers his dream, not the 
actual accident.68 Because Mr. Ladd does not have the ability to remember what he 
perceived, he is incompetent to testify. 
This point is illustrated in State v. Hall.69 In this case, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
found that a witness to a shooting was incompetent to testify.70 The witness was a victim of 
the shooting. Like Mr. Ladd, the witness was present during the relevant time period and was 
theoretically capable of perceiving the events of the shooting. However, the witness testified 
65773P.2dat33. 
66R. 219-221. 
67Brief of Appellant, pp. 6 and 8. 
68R. 165. 
69727 P.2d 1255 (Idaho App. 1986). 
70Id. at 1259-60. 
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that he "remembered nothing during the time period from the afternoon before the shootings 
until he awakened in the hospital with a head wound."71 The witness's testimony was based 
on two dreams that occurred after the shooting. The court found that the witness was not 
competent to testify. It stated that the dreams did not "establish that testimony by the witness 
is based on his own perception rather than on information acquired from others."72 
Mr. Ladd's situation is almost identical to the one in Hall. Mr. Ladd could remember 
events on the day of the accident up until the point of when he lit a cigarette while riding in 
Mr. Rassmussen's pickup truck.73 Like the witness in Hall, Mr. Ladd had a recollection of 
waking up in the hospital and remembering that his friend was dead, but he had no memory 
of the details of the accident.74 Thus, Mr. Ladd has admitted that he does not have the ability 
to remember what he allegedly perceived. His dream does not cure this defect. He can 
remember what happened in the dream, but not in the relevant accident. Thus, Mr. Ladd is 
not competent to testify. 
3. Mr. Ladd cannot testify based on personal knowledge 
Mr. Ladd does not have personal knowledge of the accident. Mr. Ladd's memory of 
the accident is based entirely on his dream, wherein he allegedly relived the accident and 
lId. at 1259. 
2Id. at 1260. 
3R. 220-221. 
4R. 219-220. 
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recovered his memory. In reality, Mr. Ladd cannot testify to the accident, but can only testify 
as to what he dreamed about. He stated that his testimony is "actually me reliving my dream 
...."
75
 Thus, he only has personal knowledge about his dream, not the accident. His dream 
is immaterial to the case at bar. As a result he is incompetent under Utah R. Evid. 602. 
Mr. Ladd's testimony is still inadmissible even if the dream helped refresh his 
memory. Because Mr. Ladd's testimony is based on a recovered memory and his memory 
was allegedly enhanced by his dream, his testimony is more akin to hypnotically-enhanced 
testimony than the less-than-complete-memory testimony in Eldrige. The Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Tuttle76 held that hypnotically-enhanced testimony is inadmissible because 
it is inherently unreliable.77 Mr. Ladd's dream-enhanced testimony is likewise inherently 
unreliable and should not be admitted as a matter of law for the same reasons as hypnotically-
enhanced testimony. 
In Tuttle, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder. On appeal, he claimed 
it was error for the trial court to allow a witness to testify to matters the witness remembered 
only after undergoing hypnosis.78 The Utah Supreme Court agreed, finding hypnotically-
enhanced testimony, including recollections after hypnosis, inadmissible.79 The Court noted 
>R. 165. 
780 P.2d 1203. 
'Id. at 1210. 
lId. at 1207. 
7rf.atl211. 
18 
that hypnosis "does not simply revive dormant memories, but augments a witness's actual 
memories by adding false or pseudo memories to them."80 
Like the hypnotically-enhanced testimony in Tuttle, Mr. Ladd's dream did not simply 
refresh his memory; it created it. Through his dream, Mr. Ladd was allegedly able to relive 
the tragic events and recover the vivid details of the accident.81 Like hypnotically-enhanced 
testimony, Mr. Ladd's dream did not simply revive dormant memories, but augmented them. 
Also, like hypnosis, Mr. Ladd's dream likely added false or pseudo memories into his 
recollection of the accident. For these reasons, Mr. Ladd's dream-enhanced testimony is 
inherently unreliable and should be excluded as a matter of law the same as hypnotically-
enhanced testimony.82 All of Mr. Ladd's testimony after his dream must be excluded as a 
matter of law under Tuttle. 
While Utah courts have not had the opportunity to directly address the issue of dream-
enhanced testimony, other courts that have considered the issue have found it to be 
inadmissible for similar reasons as stated in TuttleP In State v. Walters*4 the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court reversed a trial court which allowed a witness to testify regarding 
S0Id. at 1207 fn. 6. 
81R. 219-221 and Brief of Appellant, p. 6. 
nId. at 1210 ("hypnotically enhanced testimony should not be admitted into 
evidence"). 
*
3See e.g. State v. Hungerford, 697 A.2d 916, 922-23 (N.H. 1997) (in determining 
whether to admit repressed memories recovered through therapy, flashbacks, and dreams, 
court looked to cases involving hypnosis). 
84698A.2d 1244 (N.H. 1997). 
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an assault that she recalled as a result of a "flashback" which occurred during a dream. The 
court noted that "[o]ur concerns with the suggestibility of memory ... are equally applicable 
in the context of dreams."85 Memories recovered through dreams are not reliable and are 
subject to the same issues of suggestibility and pseudo memories as hypnotically-enhanced 
testimony. As a result, dream-enhanced testimony should not be admissible in Utah. Mr. 
Ladd does not have personal knowledge of the accident. He has personal knowledge of a 
dream about an accident that is wholly unreliable. He is not competent to testify based on 
Utah R. Evid. 602. 
C. Mr. Ladd's testimony is inadmissible 
Even if Mr. Ladd is considered competent to testify based on his dream enhanced 
testimony, the testimony would be inadmissible based on Utah R. Evid. 402 or 403, "[I]t is 
well-settled that an appellate court may affirm a trial court's ruling on any proper grounds, 
even though the trial court relied on some other ground."86 Rule 402 provides that 
"[e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible." Mr. Ladd's dream of the accident is 
completely irrelevant to what actually happened in the accident. It does nothing to establish 
the facts of the case and is therefore irrelevant. All Mr. Ladd's testimony does is establish 
the fact that he had a dream. His dream is immaterial to the accident as he testified he had 
no memory of the rollover accident, let alone the fact that there were three collisions. His 
dream is irrelevant and does not create a material issue of fact. 
%5Id. at 1248. 
*
6DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995). 
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Even if the dream is considered relevant, is it inadmissible under Utah R. Evid. 403. 
This rule allows evidence which is relevant to be excluded "if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence." Mr. Ladd's dream testimony has little probative value 
as it does not accurately reflect the events of August 10, 2003. Instead, it is more likely to 
confuse the issues or mislead the jury.87 Even if the trial court could not exclude the evidence 
under Utah R. Evid. 602, it could have done so under Utah R. Evid. 403. Mr. Ladd's dream-
enhanced testimony is inadmissible and the trial court did not error in excluding it when it 
ruled on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
D. All admissible evidence shows Defendants did not injure Mr. Ladd 
Because Mr. Ladd's testimony is inadmissible, there is no genuine issue of material 
fact. All the admissible evidence establishes that Mr. Ladd was not involved in any accident 
with Defendants. 
The most compelling evidence is the affidavit of Thomas Riessen.88 Mr. Reissen 
arrived on the scene after Mr. Rasmussen's pickup rolled. Mr. Riessen attempted to assist 
%1See Walters, 698 A.2d at 1246 (proponent of testimony comprised of recovered 
memories must demonstrate that the testimony is reliable) and Hungerford, 697 A.2d at 
921-922 (expert testimony required to present recovered memory). Mr. Ladd's testimony 
would mislead a jury without expert testimony to explain the reliability and psychological 
processes required to recover memories through dreams. As Mr. Ladd has not designated 
any experts, he cannot provide the proper context for his dream testimony and it cannot be 
admitted. 
R. 109-112. 
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Mr. Rasmussen. Mr. Riessen and Mr. Rasmussen were involved in the third accident 
involving Defendants. Mr. Riessen's affidavit establishes that only he and Mr. Rasmussen 
were involved this accident.89 Also, another witness, Natasha Nielsen, also testified that only 
Mr. Riessen and Mr. Rasmussen were involved in the third accident.90 
Finally, the officer that investigated the accident, found that Mr. Ladd was ejected 
from the pickup truck during the first accident which was the rollover accident. Trooper 
Ward found and testified that Mr. Ladd was ejected and landed west of the pickup truck.91 
Defendants' truck hit the pickup truck going east into Mr. Reissen and Mr. Rasmussen, but 
this accident did not involve Mr. Ladd as he was lying west of the pickup in the borrow pit. 
All of the admissible evidence clearly indicates that Mr. Ladd was not involved in an 
accident with the Defendants. There is no genuine issue of material fact. Summary judgment 
was appropriate as Defendants could not have caused any of Mr. Ladd's injuries. 
II. Mr. Ladd's Claim Fails Because He Cannot Prove Causation 
Even if Mr. Ladd's dream-enhanced testimony is assumed to be completely accurate 
and true, his claim still fails as a matter of law. To prevail on his negligence claims Mr. Ladd 
must prove four elements: (1) the Defendants owed Mr. Ladd a duty; (2) the Defendants' 
breached that duty; (3) the Defendants' breach proximately caused Mr. Ladd's injuries; and 
R. 109. 
(R. 133-134. 
R.115 
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(4) damages.92 Assuming arguendo that Mr. Ladd can prove elements (1), (2), and (4), his 
claim fails as a matter of law because he cannot prove element (3): proximate cause. 
A, Mr. Ladd bears the burden to prove causation 
As the plaintiff in this action, Mr. Ladd has the ultimate burden to prove all the 
elements of his negligence cause of action.93 He must have evidence sufficient to support his 
prima facie case.94 Mr. Ladd cannot provide any evidence regarding the causation of his 
injuries and therefore cannot establish a prima facie case of negligence. Mr. Ladd was 
potentially injured in three separate accidents: (1) the rollover accident; (2) the collision 
involving Richard Oak; and (3) the semi-truck accident involving Defendants. It is 
Defendants' position that Mr. Ladd received all of his injuries in the first accident, which is 
certainly plausible given the severe nature of the rollover. Mr. Ladd's testimony, if accepted, 
establishes that he was in all three accidents. Unless there is expert testimony to establish the 
injuries Mr. Ladd suffered in each accident, and how each subsequent accident affected prior 
injuries, the jury can only speculate about causation. Thus, the trial court did not commit any 
error in dismissing Mr. Ladd's case because he "failed to designate an expert witness 
regarding causation of damages. As such, [Mr. Ladd] cannot prove causation."95 
92See Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., Inc., 821 P.2d 458, 461 (Utah App. 1991). 
93See Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994) 
94See Kitchen, 821 P.2d at 462 and Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 339 
(Utah 1997). 
95R. 288. 
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Further, "[i]t is fundamental that the burden rests upon the plaintiff to establish the 
causal connection between the injury and the alleged negligence of the defendant."96 
Additionally, "[t]he causal connection between the alleged negligent act and the injury is 
never presumed and this is a matter the plaintiff is always required to prove affirmatively."97 
Mr. Ladd would have this Court and the eventual jury presume a causal connection between 
his injuries and the third accident. This is contrary to the law. Mr. Ladd cannot meet his 
burden to affirmatively prove causation and his claim fails. 
B. Medical causation must be proved by expert testimony 
Mr. Ladd asserts he is not required to designate an expert regarding causation and that 
he can simply rely on "his own testimony regarding the injuries and thus, damages he 
suffered in the accident."98 However, Utah law requires that Mr. Ladd provide expert 
testimony to establish causation. 
"In Utah, in all but the most obvious cases, testimony of lay witnesses regarding the 
need for specific medical treatment is inadequate to submit the issue to the jury."99 This is 
anything but an obvious case. According to Mr. Ladd's testimony, he was involved in two 
horrific accidents, and a minor accident, all within a matter of minutes. Each of these 
accidents could have injured Mr. Ladd in separate, distinct, and serious ways. Additionally, 
%Jackson v. Colston, 209 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1949). 
91
 Fox v. Brigham Young University, 2007 UT App 406, t 21, 176 P.3d 446 (citing 
Jackson, 209 P.2d at 568). 
98Brief of Appellant, p. 10. 
"Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 2000 UT App 285, \ 16, 12 P.3d 1015. 
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the effects of each accident could have combined to cause injuries that are beyond the 
common knowledge of the jury. This case contains "obscure medical factors which are 
beyond an ordinary lay person's knowledge" so Mr. Ladd must provide "positive expert 
testimony to establish a causal link between the defendants' negligent act and the plaintiffs 
injury."100 Without any expert testimony, the jury would be left to speculate as to which 
accident caused which injury and the extent to which a subsequent accident aggravated 
injuries from a prior accident. Mr. Ladd's testimony is insufficient to establish a causal link 
and he is required to provide expert testimony on medical causation. 
C. Mr. Ladd failed to designate any expert witnesses 
Mr. Ladd admits that he did not designate any expert witnesses.101 The Case 
Management Order for this case was entered on March 24, 2009.l02 Pursuant to that Order, 
Mr. Ladd was to designate experts by January 8, 2010. This date came and went and Mr. 
Ladd did not designate any expert witnesses. Mr. Ladd also did not request an amendment 
to the Case Management Order. Mr. Ladd had every opportunity to designate experts but did 
not do so. "While scheduling orders should never be so inflexible as to not accommodate 
exigencies that may occur, they are necessary to expedite the flow of cases through the court 
system and should not be lightly disregarded."103 Mr. Ladd has not claimed any exigencies 
mId. (citing Riggins v. Bechtel Power Corp., 44 Wash.App. 244, 722 P.2d 819, 824 
(1986)). 
i01Brief of Appellant, p. 9. 
102R. 22-26. 
mArnoldv. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1993). 
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or that he needs more time to designate experts. Instead he only claims that he is not required 
to designate any experts.104 
For the first time on appeal, Mr. Ladd now claims he can rely on his treating 
physicians without designating them as expert witnesses.105 Before the trial court, Mr. Ladd 
only asserted the he could testify as to the different injuries he sustained in each accident.106 
In fact, Mr. Ladd argued that he "is not required to do more" than offer his own testimony 
regarding his injuries and medical treatment.107 Not once before the trial court did Mr. Ladd 
assert that he would and could rely on testimony of his treating physicians regarding 
causation. Thus, Mr. Ladd has not preserved his argument that he can rely on his treating 
physicians for proof of medical causation for appeal. Issues not preserved for appeal cannot 
be considered by this Court.108 
Mr. Ladd's tardy assertion that his treating physicians can testify regarding causation 
is insufficient to cure the defects in his case. Despite his intention to rely on his treating 
physicians, Mr. Ladd cannot do so because he did not designate his treating physicians as 
experts. Mr. Ladd believes that he is not required to designate his treating physicians as 
[See Brief of Appellant, pp. 9-10. 
!Brief of Appellant, p. 10. 
>R. 182-183. 
'R. 182. 
'LaChance v. Richman, 2011 UT App 40, ^  15, 248 P.3d 1020. 
26 
experts.109 Mr. Ladd relies on Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B) and Drew v. Leem to support this 
assertion. Mr. Ladd's reliance on these authorities is wholly misplaced. These authorities deal 
with expert reports, not with the designation of experts. Mr. Ladd completely failed to 
designate any experts as required by Utah law. The trial court did not error in granting 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment based on Mr. Ladd's failure to designate any 
expert witnesses. 
Mr. Ladd's arguments that his treating physicians do not need to provide expert 
reports completely ignores the requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A). This rule 
provides that "[a] party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any persons who may 
be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence."111 Mr. Ladd failed meet this requirement of Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3).112 Mr. 
Ladd's reliance on Drew is also misplaced because the Utah Supreme Court specifically 
limited it's analysis to Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B) and found that Pete v. Youngblood113 
addressed Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A).114 
109Brief of Appellant, p. 9 - 10. 
1102011 UT 15, 678 Utah Adv. Rep. 4. 
mUtah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added). 
mSee Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 303, \ 11, 141 P.3d 629 (Rule 26(a)(3) 
creates two distinct requirements for disclosure of expert testimony the first being disclosure 
of the identity of experts). 
1132006 UT App 303, 141 P.3d 629. 
U4Drew, 2011 UT15atf 15. 
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Youngblood is the controlling authority for this case. Drew is completely inapplicable 
because it does not deal with designation of experts. In Youngblood, the plaintiff brought a 
medical malpractice action against a plastic surgeon for leaving gauze in the surgical site.115 
Like Mr. Ladd, the plaintiff did not designate any expert witnesses by the deadline in the case 
management order.116 The plaintiff made the same argument as Mr. Ladd that she was not 
required to designate her treating physicians as expert witnesses. This argument was rejected 
by this Court. This Court found that treating physicians are not exempt from the expert 
designation requirement in Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A).117 This Court noted that "[njothing 
in rule 26(a)(3)(A) limits the obligation to identify persons who may be used to give expert 
opinions."118 If a treating physician is going to testify beyond a factual description of his or 
her personal observations during treatment, such as when treating physicians testify as to 
causation, the treating physician must be designated as an expert.119 Mr. Ladd is required to 
disclose his treating physicians as expert witnesses if he is going to rely upon their testimony 
regarding the causation of his injuries. He did not designate any expert witnesses. 
As this Court noted in Youngblood, "[f]ormal disclosures of experts is not pointless. 
... [E]ven treating physicians ... must be designated as experts if they are to provide expert 
l l 52006UTAppatt 1. 
l l6ta.at1f5. 
ulId. atffif 11 and 15. 
mId. atf 12. 
n9Id. atffl 13 and 14. 
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testimony."120 Mr. Ladd is not qualified to testify regarding which accident caused his 
specific injuries. Utah law requires that medical causation be established by expert testimony 
in complex cases.121 However, Mr. Ladd failed to designate any experts. As a result, he 
cannot prove an essential element of his claim and his claim fails as a matter of law. 
D. Mr. Ladd's claim fails as a matter of law 
"Summary judgment is appropriate against a party who, after discovery, fails to set 
forth facts sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's 
case."122 While the issue of proximate cause is usually one for the jury, a court can decide 
proximate cause as a matter of law when: (1) there is no evidence to establish a causal 
connection, thus leaving causation to jury speculation, or (2) where reasonable persons could 
not differ on the inferences to be derived from the evidence on proximate causation.123 
Because Mr. Ladd has not provided any expert testimony regarding the causation of his 
injuries, the jury can only speculate as to which of the three accidents caused his injuries. 
"When the proximate cause of an injury is left to speculation, the claim fails as a matter 
of law."124 
mId. at Tf 17 (internal citations and emphasis omitted). 
121Fox, 2007 UT App 406 at If 22. 
mChristiansen v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2006 UT App 180, If 6, 136 P.3d 1266 
(internal citations omitted). 
123See Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482,487 (Utah App. 1991). 
mStaheli v. Farmers' Co-op of Southern Utah, 655 P.2d 680, 684 (Utah 1982) 
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The only testimony regarding causation Mr. Ladd has proposed to offer is his own 
testimony. He claims that he can distinguish the injuries he suffered in the rollover accident 
from those allegedly suffered in the third accident involving Defendants. Like the jury, Mr. 
Ladd can only speculate regarding which accident caused which injury. Mr. Ladd's testimony 
is that he does not remember any details of the accident.125 He can supplement that testimony 
with details of a dream that he purports to be a reenactment of the actual accident.126 Even 
if this testimony is allowed it fails to provide the causal link between the Defendants 
negligent conduct and Mr. Ladd's injuries. It is also insufficient to present the issue to a jury. 
"[T]he 'testimony of lay witnesses regarding the need for specific medical treatment is 
inadequate to submit the issue to the jury.'"127 
Utah's Comparative Negligence Act provides that "the maximum amount for which 
a defendant may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of 
the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that 
defendant."128 With no expert testimony, Mr. Ladd cannot show what proportion of his 
injuries, if any, were caused by Defendants. Thus, any award would necessarily violate 
Utah's Comparative Negligence Act.129 
I25R. 163. 
126R. 165. 
127Fox, 2007 UT App 406 at f 22 (citing Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 2000 UT App 285, f 16,12 
P.3dl015). 
l28Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-820(l). 
mSee Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Parker, 936 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Utah App. 1997). 
30 
M~ f nd'.i -v.i\ni. I.uls nc. a m a t t e r of .. - • .. f t i -<«• :• - • 
k - s i .: • : !---i • .1 • •. ••..>: would be required to engage in 
rank speculation to decide this case. Thus, Mr. Ladd's ekuin must be dismissed and summary 
jud^iiK/nc was appropriate. The trial court's order should be affi.mied. 
I < \\\\ 1 \ I , N H PI" mi 
1 • m "i.intiiu? sum ;. uidgment. The trial court acted 
v :t us discretion when it excluded Mr Ladd's dream-enhanced iesii:uon\ from 
consideration on the Motion f< »r Summary Judgment. Further, Mr, I,add's failure to designate 
an expert witness prevents him from proving ins pt mid uiae case tu lugimem I \\~- mm 
fails as a matter*: . * , . ; . . . . . •* • . :
 ;.
 j
 ^ affirmed. 
D A I ED tl lis _ _ _ 3 _ day of May, 2011. 
PI .ANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
Theodore E. Kanell 
Daniel E. Young 
Attorneys for Appellees Bowers Trucking, Inc. and 
Tyrone A. Granlund, and/or 
'Estate of Tyrone A. Granlund 
31 
CERTIFICATE OF MAIUNG 
I hereby certify that on the 9 day of May, 2011, two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellees was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
S. Brook Millard 
11650 South State Street Suite 103 
Draper, UT 84020 
32 
